There is a tendency to condemn anthropocentricism, and, even more, to condemn theological anthropomorphism, which is why I call it Properly Anthropocentric Metaphysics (PAM), and why I call my theology DAT, Defiantly Anthropomorphic Theism. Personal Pantheism is anthropomorphic in the sense that the features of human beings not explained scientifically provide precedents for our conception of God.
For Ockham’s Razor weighs against those conceptions without precedent. The version of Ockham’s Razor being appealed to here is not that entities should not be multiplied but that kinds of entity should not be multiplied without good reason, and the more novel the kind, the better the required reasons. To be sure, God is a novel kind of being but Personal Pantheism keeps the novelty to a minimum thus reducing the Ockhamist objection to theism and hence supporting it as a conception of God.
This Ockhamist methodology should be contrasted with that of Perfect Being Theology (Morris 1988), which following St Anselm, posits various divine attributes even if they have no human precedent, on the grounds that they would add to the divine value. The theological Ockhamist, by contrast, attributes to God various human characteristics that cannot wholly be understood in a naturalistic fashion based largely on the theory of the brain.
Personal Pantheism is anthropomorphic in the sense that the features of human beings not explained scientifically provide precedents for our conception of God.