The second commitment is the supposition that at least some positive theological statements are, in fact, true. Buckareff asserts that if we wish to avoid treating talk of divine action as merely metaphorical and avoid theological anti-realism, the question that naturally arises is “What must God be like if we are to truthfully employ action-predicates when we are making claims about divine action?”

This question forces us to determine what the ontological commitments of our religious language are. Buckareff assumes a truthmaker criterion of ontological commitment on which the ontological commitments of some theoretical discourse are the things that must exist to make the sentences of that discourse true. Focusing on divine action sentences, Buckareff argues that if we wish to be theological realists about statements about divine action, then we must reject the traditional metaphysics of theism that takes God to be wholly immaterial and not spatiotemporally located.

He argues that if God is an agent who performs discrete intentional actions, the effects of which can be indexed to locations in space-time, then God’s actions have a spatiotemporal location. And if God’s actions can be located in space-time, then God is located in space-time, being in some sense embodied by the universe.