If PAM supports Substance Dualism then, without introducing totally novel kinds of entity, we may posit God as a spirit, with powers similar to that of a human soul, although vastly greater. On the other hand if PAM does not support Substance Dualism then Ockham’s Razor renders the standard conceptions implausible. I argue that PAM does not support Substance Dualism. I also argue that the familiar qualia do not provide any precedent for the divine mind.

My case for Personal Pantheism rests on the way that proprioception may, however, be extrapolated to the divine mind. I also provide an account of human agency as increasing the determinacy of a not wholly determinate spatiotemporal universe. Using this, and proprioception, as the precedents for the divine nature. To show that Personal Pantheism does not undermine theism requires an argument for theism, which can be shown to be adaptable to Personal Pantheism.

The role of such argument in supporting religious faith is contested, and mostly I leave it to readers to assess whether there is any undermining. Awareness and action are two of the topics where I reject the naturalistic account as inadequate. Because these topics provide the precedents for God, who is aware and who acts, a detailed theory of them should be a preliminary to Defiantly Anthropomorphic Theism. Such a detailed theory would have to take notice of debates in the philosophy of mind.


My purpose in this chapter is less ambitious, however, and I need to consider awareness and action only so as to argue for Personal Pantheism over standard conceptions of God.